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BEYOND FEAR: ARTICULATING A MODERN 
DOCTRINE IN ANTICIPATORY NUISANCE FOR 
ENJOINING IMPROBABLE THREATS OF 
CATASTROPHIC HARM 
Charles J. Doane* 
We must not make a scarecrow of the law, 
Setting it up to fear the birds of prey, 
And let it keep one shape, till custom make it 
Their perch, and not their terror. 
Measure for Measure, Act II, Scene 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Genetic technicians at Man-Bug, Inc. have spent the last seven 
years developing a new synthetic bacterium, Ice-Ten, that raises the 
freezing point of water by ten degrees. Man-Bug executives believe 
Ice-Ten has tremendous potential in the ski industry, which is con-
stantly looking for better ways to keep snow on the ground longer, 
and are eager to rush their microbe to market. The Man-Bug tech-
nicians have conducted extensive laboratory tests and feel certain 
Ice-Ten poses no threat to the environment. Having obtained all 
required governmental permits, Man-Bug is finally ready to conduct 
field tests as to Ice-Ten's capabilities on open ground. 
Word of the tests has spread, however, and residents and farmers 
in the area of the test site are concerned about the effects the 
bacteria will have on their property. The farmers, in particular, are 
concerned about Ice-Ten getting loose and causing frost damage to 
their crops. 
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Man-Bug knows there is some chance Ice-Ten may travel a short 
distance from the point of exposure and linger a bit longer than 
expected, but it sees this risk as small and has insured against the 
limited amount of damage liability it expects to incur in a worst-case 
scenario. Some experts in the field have postulated, however, that 
bacteria such as Ice-Ten, once in the open, might not only linger 
indefinitely, but might also spread quite far from the point of expo-
sure. A few experts have even predicted a very slight chance of such 
bacteria going absolutely wild and turning the planet into a frozen 
ice-ball in a matter of years. 1 
Confronted with the prospect of having their property trans-
formed into an arctic wasteland, the local residents and farmers, 
after failing in their bid to challenge Man-Bug's permits, have de-
cided to file a nuisance action seeking an injunction to keep the tests 
from going forward. 2 The question presented by this scenario and 
others like it is whether a court in equity is doctrinally equipped to 
recognize and react to a slight, but very real, threat of absolutely 
catastrophic harm. 
Generally, tort law asks that one suffer injury prior to asserting 
an action in either law or equity for damages or injunctive relief. 3 
Even when confronted with activity that is known to be abnormally 
dangerous, courts often will not take steps to prevent injury from 
taking place, but, through the doctrine of strict liability, will ensure 
a plaintiff's recovery for harm suffered by obviating the need to 
prove fault. 4 It is also true, however, that in nuisance law courts 
1 See K. VONNEGUT, CAT'S CRADLE (1963). Vonnegut hypothesized an agent, Ice Nine, 
developed by the military as a weapon, which posed just such a threat. The significance of 
the threat is explored at various points in Vonnegut's fiction and essays. 
2 See Californians for Responsible Toxics Management v. Berryhill, No. 342097 (Cal. Super. 
Ct. Apr. 23, 1987). This unreported case, in a scenario similar to the one posed here, involved 
a genetic engineering firm seeking to test a bacterium, Frostban, which lowered the freezing 
point of water. Such a bacteria might help farmers reduce frost damage to their crops. Plaintiffs 
sought unsuccessfully to block open-air testing of Frostban by challenging the permitting 
process and never raised any common-law nuisance claims. 
3 PROSSER & KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 1 (5th ed. 1984). "The law of torts, then, is 
concerned with the allocation of losses arising out of human activities .... The purpose of 
the law of torts is to adjust these losses, and to afford compensation for injuries sustained by 
one person as the result of the conduct of another." Id. at 6 (citing Wright, Introduction to 
the Law oj Torts, 8 CAMB. L.J. 238 (1944)). 
4 See Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868) (first major case to articulate the doctrine 
of strict liability). Generally, the modern rationale behind the doctrine is that a defendant will 
be allowed to engage in abnormally dangerous activity when the benefits of the activity 
outweigh the risk it creates. The activity, however, "must pay its way," and the defendant 
will be held strictly liable for any harm that results. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, § 75, 
at 536--37. 
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have long exercised a power to enjoin activity harmful to plaintiffs 
when recovery of damages at law will not provide an adequate 
remedy.5 In some instances, a court may go so far as to enjoin as an 
anticipatory or prospective nuisance activity that has not yet caused 
harm, but threatens to do SO.6 In these cases, however, courts have 
focused only on the probability of harm, and have required a high 
probability (although not an absolute certainty) of injury before 
enjoining the threatening activity. 7 
Increasingly, courts can expect to find themselves confronted with 
risk assessment problems such as the one posed in the Ice-Ten 
scenario above. Modern technologies such as genetic engineering 
will create more threats of potentially irreparable or catastrophic 
harm to individuals and the environment that cannot be effectively 
compensated after the fact. 8 Because the threats of catastrophic 
harm created by modern technology can be small or altogether un-
certain, actions in anticipatory nuisance will fail for an inability to 
show a high probability of injury.9 This Comment takes the position 
that anticipatory nuisance is a doctrine particularly well-suited to 
meeting the challenges posed to tort law by modern technology, but 
argues that the doctrine must be substantially modified if it is to 
realize this potential. 
Section II of this Comment surveys briefly the relationship be-
tween tort law and technology and the unique risks created by 
modern technology. Section III describes the doctrine of anticipatory 
nuisance as traditionally applied by courts. Section IV identifies case 
precedent in which courts have sought to evade the limitations of 
traditional anticipatory nuisance doctrine. Finally, section V argues 
that a complete modernization of traditional anticipatory nuisance 
doctrine is appropriate within the context of the historical relation-
ship between tort and technology and can be accomplished without 
unreasonably hindering technological progress. 
5 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, § 89, at 640. 
6 Id. at 640-41. See generally Comment, An Ounce of Prevention: Rehabilitating the 
Anticipatory Nuisance Doctrine, 15 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 627 (1988) (authored by 
Andrew H. Sharp). 
7 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, § 89, at 640-41 (citing, e.g., Hamilton Corp. v. Julian, 
130 Md. 597, 101 A. 558 (1917); Nelson v. Swedish Evangelical Cemetery Ass'n, 111 Minn. 
149, 127 N.W. 626 (1910)). 
8 See Furrow, Governing Science: Public Risks and Private Remedies, 131 U. PENN. L. 
REV. 1403, 1408 (1983). 
9 E.g., Purcell v. Davis, 100 Mont. 480, 494, 50 P.2d 255, 258 (1935) (court refused to enjoin 
proposed oil refinery in residential neighborhood due to uncertainty of threatened noxious 
fumes, explosions, and fire). 
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II. TORT AND TECHNOLOGY 
A. The Historical Relationship Between Tort and Technology 
It almost might be said that tort law did not exist prior to the 
emergence of modern technology. Though the first seeds of tort 
liability were sown in England as early as the twelfth century,10 the 
field of tort remained a neglected and undeveloped backwater until 
well into the nineteenth century. 11 Prior to this time, tort was hardly 
mentioned, if at all, in legal treatises. By the end of the nineteenth 
century, it had evolved abruptly into a major field of law deserving 
the attention of the most respected legal scholars.12 The reason for 
the sudden development of tort law is well understood. As humani-
ty's machines, particularly the railroad, vastly increased our capacity 
for injuring others, that portion of the law that governs relationships 
between people who injure one another was forced to keep pace. 13 
Most significant modern tort doctrines originated in or were sem-
inally influenced by technological advance. Strict liability, 14 products 
liability,15 market-share liability,16 proximate cause,17 contributory 
and comparative negligence,18 and even the elemental concept of 
10 W. LANDES & R. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 2 (1987). The first 
causes of action were in intentional tort, wherein damages could be recovered through the 
writ of trespass vi et armis (by force and arms) in battery cases. For a brief discussion of the 
development of trespass writs, see J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL 
HISTORY 56-59 (1979). 
11 L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 409 (1973); LANDES & POSNER, supra 
note 10, at ~; SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE TORT LIABILITY SYSTEM, AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION, TOWARDS A JURISPRUDENCE OF INJURY: THE CONTINUING CREATION OF A 
SYSTEM OF SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 1-2 (Report to the American Bar 
Association 1984) [hereinafter ABA ReportJ. . 
12 L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 409. The first treatise on tort law was not published 
until 1859. Id. See F. HILLIARD, THE LAW OF TORTS, OR PRIVATE WRONGS (1859). Little 
more than 20 years later, a great deal of literature had grown up around the subject. See, 
e.g., O. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW chs. 3-4 (1881). 
13 L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 409. A good portion of the new tort suits being brought 
in the mid- to late nineteenth century were directly attributable to the dramatic growth of 
the railroad. "In 1840, there were less than 3,000 miles of track in the United States; by 1850, 
9,000; by 1860, 30,000; by 1870, 52,000. Personal-injury cases grew as fast as trackage." Id. 
at 412. 
14 E.g., Langan v. Valicopters, Inc., 88 Wash. 2d 855,567 P.2d 218 (1977). 
15 E.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916); Baxter v. 
Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932). 
15 E.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). 
17 E.g., Palsgraf V. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928); Petition of 
Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708 (1964). 
18 E.g., Butterfield V. Forrester, 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (1809) (contributory negli-
gence); Li V. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226 (1975) (comparative negligence). 
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negligence itself19 are all examples of doctrines in tort law shaped, 
if not created, by the development of technological society. 20 
Throughout the evolution of these doctrines, the creative tension 
dominating judicial thinking in tort law vacillated between a positiv-
ist economic desire to protect and encourage emerging technologies 
and a humanistic urge to insure that plaintiffs were compensated for 
their injuries. 21 
This tension is particularly well illustrated in railroad cases. In 
the mid-nineteenth century, railroads were still young and promised 
to transform the national economy.22 Eager to protect railroad com-
panies from crippling jury verdicts, judges therefore refashioned or 
invented such concepts as assumption of risk, contributory negli-
gence, and the fellow-servant rule to keep the scope of liability under 
strict control. 23 By the beginning of the twentieth century, however, 
railroads were well established and the number of persons injured 
by them was rising dramatically.24 Courts, using such tools as the 
last clear chance doctrine, res ipsa loquitur, the vice-principal rule, 
and strict liability, responded by abrogating restrictions on liability 
formed just decades earlier. 25 
This vacillation between restricting and liberalizing liability is a 
pattern repeated throughout tort law. Courts are willing, indeed see 
19 E.g., Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. Co. v. Krayenbuhl, 65 Neb. 889, 91 N.W. 880 (1902); Davison 
v. Snohomish County, 149 Wash. 109, 270 P. 422 (1928). 
20 See generally L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 409; ABA Report, supra note 11, at 1-2. 
"It is no coincidence . . . that the blossoming of tort law has occurred parallel to the rise in 
complexity of economic ordering technology .... Tort law has been a response to all of those 
developments, providing some suppleness in the joints of the legal system as events place 
strains on the social order. " [d. 
21 See L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 409-27. 
22 [d. at 410. "In this first generation of tort law, the railroad was the prince of machines, 
both as symbol and as fact. It was the key to economic development. It cleared an iron path 
through the wilderness. It bound cities together, and tied the farms to the city and seaports." 
[d. 
23 [d. at 409-27. For an especially compelling example of a court seeking to protect a railroad 
from potentially debilitating liability, see Ryan v. New York Central Railroad, 35 N.Y. 210 
(1866). The defendant railroad negligently allowed one of its engines to set fire to a woodshed 
on its property. From there, the fire spread to a neighboring house and thence to several 
others. The court found the damage to the houses was too remote and denied recovery. [d. 
"The railroad in Ryan was held not liable precisely because the harm it caused was too great, 
even though the damage could clearly, morally, be laid at its door." L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 
11, at 411 (emphasis in original). 
24 L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 422. "The railway injury rate doubled between 1889 and 
1906. At the turn of the century, industrial accidents were claiming about 35,000 lives a year, 
and inflicting close to 2,000,000 injuries." [d. 
25 [d. at 417-27. Also, a good deal of the reaction to the harsh common-law rules adopted 
in the mid-nineteenth century came in the form of statutory reform initiated by legislatures. 
[d. 
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it as part of their function, to encourage technological and economic 
progress, but they are also sensitive to the costs incurred in,terms 
of human suffering. 26 
B. The Nature of Twentieth Century Technological Risk 
The machines invented in the nineteenth century and perfected in 
the early twentieth century are for the most part devices that cause 
harm in direct, visibly foreseeable, and essentially limited ways.27 It 
is, for instance, entirely foreseeable to an automobile manufacturer 
that its product~ if defective, may inflict certain specific sorts of 
injuries upon a finite and identifiable group of people. 28 Because these 
injuries are foreseeable, the manufacturer can take reasonable steps 
to prevent their occurrence. Because they will be limited in nature, 
the manufacturer will also be able to compensate those injuries that 
do occur. Thus, risks created by simple industrial technology are 
appropriately treated within the traditional framework of a tort 
system that seeks primarily to compensate victims for harm already 
suffered. 
It is not, however, foreseeable to the Man-Bug executives in the 
scenario outlined above just how much harm they can reasonably 
expect their product to cause if it malfunctions. They have estab-
lished in their own minds what they consider to be an outside limit 
to their potential liability, but, as proponents of Ice-Ten, their per-
spective is subjective. They therefore may be willing to ignore the 
perhaps very small chance that their product will cause catastrophic 
harm. If Ice-Ten does cause catastrophic harm, Man-Bug probably 
will not be able to compensate the victims. Such dilemmas promise 
to become increasingly characteristic of technologies developed in 
the mid- to late twentieth century. 29 
As modern science cuts ever closer to a comprehensive under-
standing of matter, energy, and life itself, it creates technologies 
26 See id, at 409-27, 
27Id. "[Tlrains were also wild beasts; they roared through the countryside, killing livestock, 
setting fire to crops, smashing passengers and freight." Id. at 410. 
28 E.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916) (court held 
that, although an automobile is not inherently dangerous, it was foreseeable that it would 
pose an imminent threat if negligently constructed). Just as railroads dominated personal 
injury law in the latter half of the nineteenth century, automobiles increasingly dominated it 
in the first half of the twentieth century. "In some states in the 1950's, wrecks on the highway 
accounted for up to forty per cent of the cases decided by appellate courts." L. FRIEDMAN, 
supra note 11, at 588. 
29 Furrow, supra note 8, at 1408; Bohrer, Fear and Trembling in the Twentieth Century: 
Technological Risk, Uncertainty and Emotional Distress, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 83, 86-89 (1984). 
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that promise tremendous benefits to society. At the same time, these 
technologies have transformed, and will continue to transform, the 
scale and nature of the harm with which humanity can threaten both 
itself and the environment. 30 
Genetic engineering, chemical engineering (including toxic chem-
ical, pharmaceutical, and pesticide production), and nuclear energy 
are examples of technologies that pose risks of personal and envi-
ronmental harm that may not be effectively addressed within the 
framework of the traditional compensatory tort system. 31 Such tech-
nologies may threaten broad segments of the population with poten-
tially catastrophic harm and may cause injuries that are difficult to 
anticipate. 32 The risks posed by modern technologies thus may be 
harder to quantify and identify than the more straightforward risks 
posed by the comparatively simple mechanical innovations of the 
nineteenth century. 33 
Commentators and scholars have debated at some length on 
whether courts should play an active role in the regulation of modern 
technological risk. 34 Those arguing against an increased judicial role 
have expressed fears that courts lack the technical expertise to 
evaluate complex risks and are likely to inhibit technological prog-
ress. 35 These writers believe regulation of modern technological risks 
should be left largely to administrative agencies. 36 
30 Bohrer, supra note 29, at 86-89. 
31Id. at 86. 
32Id. at 86-89. 
33 Id. Furthermore, as technology has become more complex, the analytical nature of 
technical risk management has changed. See generally Whipple, Fundamentals of Risk As-
sessment, 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10190 (Aug. 1986). Engineers and scientists can 
no longer rely on the traditional trial-and-error method of identifying weaknesses in design, 
but increasingly work with technologies that "demand a predictive method that does not 
require error for learning." Id. at 1019l. 
34 Compare, e.g., Bohrer, supra note 29 with Huber, Safety and Second Best: The Hazards 
of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277 (1985). These two writers 
provide good examples of the well-reasoned extremes that may be reached in arguing this 
issue. Bohrer goes so far as to argue that the threat of harm from twentieth century technology 
is distinct enough to be recognized as compensable emotional distress at common law. Bohrer, 
supra note 29, at 122. Huber, in contrast, urges that common-law judges may so mishandle 
complex risk assessment problems as to inadvertently increase the total amount of harm to 
which people are exposed and argues that administrative agencies are better equipped to 
handle the task. His article provides a good critical survey of the literature in favor of an 
increased judicial role. Huber, supra, at 329. 
35 E.g., Huber, supra note 34, at 329; Stewart, The Role of Courts in Risk Management, 
16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10208, 10209 (Aug. 1986). See generally Pedersen, What 
Judges Should Know About Risk, 2 NATURAL RESOURCES & ENV'T 35 (Fall 1986). 
36 E.g., Huber, supra note 34, at 329; Stewart, supra note 35, at 10209. 
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Meanwhile, those in favor of an increased judicial role question 
whether administrative agencies are sensitive enough to the public 
interest in regulating such risks. 37 These writers also raise doubts 
as to whether scientists and engineers involved in the development 
of new technologies are capable of objectively assessing the risks 
they create,38 and whether legislatures are capable of responding 
quickly enough to new sources of risk created by sudden accelera-
tions in scientific knowledge. 39 
This Comment assumes, arguendo, that an active judicial role in 
the regulation of modern technological risk is appropriate and that 
common-law tort remedies can coexist with administrative reme-
dies. 40 Courts, however, will be unable to play an effective role in 
regulating threats of widespread and potentially catastrophic or ir-
reversible harm if they are not willing to directly address such 
threats before injury takes place. 41 
III. ANTICIPATORY NUISANCE: THE TRADITIONAL ApPROACH TO 
ENJOINING FUTURE HARM 
Although tort law is primarily concerned with allocating the cost 
of past injury in an efficient and fair manner, it also seeks to prevent 
and deter injury from occurring.42 The standard of negligence, for 
example, defines an area of discretion within which the reasonable 
actor is expected to take precautions against foreseeable injury, and 
it is only when persons fail to take such precautions that compen-
sation is mandated. 43 In fashionIng such doctrines as strict liability 
and products liability, courts have stated that they are concerned 
not only with seeing injury compensated, but also with providing 
strong incentives for the prevention of injury. 44 
37 See, e.g., Furrow, supra note 8, at 1434. 
38 See, e.g., id. at 1412-16. 
39 See, e.g., id. at 1432-34. 
40 See ABA Report, supra note 11, at 12-1 to 12-6. Tort law can play an important role 
"knitting" together statutes and regulatory schemes and is flexible enough to provide indivi-
dualized justice. Furthermore, the decentralized nature of case-by-case tort litigation produces 
a body of law more immediately responsive to problems arising in a complex society and 
allows for the ongoing identification of moral issues and problems that may not be directly 
addressed by administrative agencies. Id. 
41 Furrow, supra note 8, at 1429-30. 
42 ABA Report, supra note 11, at 4-3 to 4-4. "A strong thread running through tort law is 
judicial desire to reduce the number and severity of accidents." Id. at 4-3. 
43 United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). 
44 See, e.g., Brizendine v. Visador Co., 305 F. Supp. 157, 160 (D. Or. 1969); Tillman v. Vance 
Equip. Co., 286 Or. 747, 756, 596 P.2d 1299, 1304 (1979). 
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Anticipatory nuisance is one tort doctrine that focuses directly on 
the issue of whether or not injury should be prevented before it 
occurs.45 When deciding an action in anticipatory nuisance, a court 
does not ask whether the plaintiff should receive compensation for 
harm already suffered. Rather, the court asks whether the defendant 
should be enjoined from injuring the plaintiff in the first place.46 
Because it allows courts to act directly to prevent injury before it 
occurs, the doctrine of anticipatory nuisance offers a potentially 
effective vehicle for addressing modern threats of catastrophic or 
irreversible harm. 47 
A. Nuisance Generally 
Nuisance has remained one of the more vaguely defined areas of 
law, due in large part to the broad range of plaintiffs' interests and 
defendants' conduct that it encompasses. 48 Perhaps as a result of its 
ambiguous nature, nuisance law has been under-utilized by courts 
and litigants as a common-law tool for addressing modern risk as-
sessment problems. 49 
A private nuisance is defined generally as any activity on the part 
of a defendant that creates a substantial and unreasonable interfer-
ence with a plaintiff's use and enjoyment of his or her own land. 50 
45 See Comment, supra note 6, at 629. 
46 [d. at 628. 
47 See id. at 629. 
48 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, § 86, at 616. "It has meant all things to all people, 
and has been applied indiscriminately to everything from an alarming advertisement to a 
cockroach baked in a pie." [d. (citing Commonwealth v. Cassidy, 6 Phila. 82 (1865); Carroll v. 
New York Pie Baking Co., 215 A.D. 240, 213 N. Y.S. 552 (1926». See also ABA Report, supra 
note 11, at 5-57: 
[d. 
If legal doctrines were analogized to biological development, the theory of nuisance 
would be said to have one of the most complex genetic inheritances in the field of 
torts. It partakes of all of the major theories of culpability, and it is a prism for 
competing views of the equities and the economics of injury laws. 
49 See Furrow, supra note 8, at 1438. "It has come to be viewed as little more than an 
historical source of ideas useful in establishing administrative risk-assessment procedures, a 
way station on the path to public regulation. " [d. One commentator suggests that plaintiffs 
are less apt to bring actions in anticipatory nuisance because of the sometimes vague nature 
of the doctrine. Comment, supra note 6, at 632. 
50 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, § 86, at 619-23. The concept of private nuisance as 
an action at law developed as early as the thirteenth century in the form of the assize of 
nuisance, a criminal writ that also offered civil relief and protected a plaintiff's land from 
invasions resulting from conduct taking place wholly on a defendant's property. The assize of 
nuisance was later supplanted by the action on the case for nuisance, limited to local interfer-
ence with the use and enjoyment of private land. [d. at 617. 
--------------------
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A defendant's activities may be entirely reasonable, but might still 
result in a substantial and unreasonable interference with a plain-
tiff's rights. 51 Generally, the sensibilities of the ordinary or reason-
able person living in the locality in question will provide the standard 
for defining substantial and unreasonable interference. 52 Thus, pri-
vate nuisance not only protects against physical damage to the prop-
erty itself, but also protects against those annoyances and discom-
forts that are unreasonable within the local community. 53 
Public nuisance, on the other hand, is a less precisely defined term 
referring to "unreasonable interferences with [rights] common to the 
general public"54 which are not necessarily linked to the use and 
enjoyment of property. 55 Though these interferences are now usually 
set forth in statutes and are often criminal in nature, a defendant 
need not be criminally culpable to be liable in public nuisance. 56 To 
sue for damages in public nuisance, a private plaintiff must show 
that he or she has suffered a unique type of injury, as opposed to a 
unique degree of injury, not shared by the rest of the public. 57 
Historically, nuisance law was used for striking land-use bargains 
prior to the emergence of modern zoning and planning laws. 58 The 
advent of industrial technology in the nineteenth century gave rise 
to cases in which nuisance served as a tool for adjusting the rights 
of industrial and agrarian or residential landowners as their respec-
tive uses of property increasingly conflicted with one another. 59 As 
in the early evolution of nineteenth century personal injury law, 
51Id. § 88, at 629. 
52Id. at 627-28. 
53 Id. § 87, at 619-20. A private nuisance "may consist of a disturbance of the comfort or 
convenience of the occupant, as by unpleasant odors, smoke or dust or gas, loud noises, 
excessive light or high temperatures, or even repeated phone calls." Id. (citations omitted). 
54 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(1) (1979) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. 
55 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, § 90, at 643. Public nuisance evolved as a strictly 
criminal action that protected the rights of the crown and the public in general. Originally, 
this action was restricted to encroachments upon royal property or the public highways, 
known as purprestures, and also came to be referred to as nuisance. Id. § 86, at 617-18. 
Gradually, its boundaries were expanded to include "any act not warranted by law, or omission 
to discharge a legal duty, which inconveniences the public in the exercise of rights common 
to all Her Majesty's subjects." Id. at 618 (citing STEPHEN, GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL 
LAW OF ENGLAND 105 (1890)). By the sixteenth century, the action could be brought by 
private individuals in civil suits. Id. 
56 Id. at 645-46; RESTATEMENT, supra note 54, § 821B comment d. 
57 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, § 90, at 646; RESTATEMENT, supra note 54, § 821C(I). 
58 Furrow, supra note 8, at 1438 (citing Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, 
Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681 (1973)). 
59Id. at 1439. 
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judges were solicitous of economic progress and generally were care-
ful not to apply nuisance law in such a manner as to retard industrial 
and technological development. 60 
Remedies in public and private nuisance actions include both dam-
ages and injunctive relief. 61 Central to a determination of whether a 
defendant's activities can be enjoined as a nuisance, public or private, 
is whether or not such activity or conduct is unreasonable. 62 This 
determination is made through what is referred to as a "balancing 
of the equities," wherein the relative hardships to the plaintiff and 
the defendant are weighed against one another.63 This balancing 
includes a determination as to whether the social utility of the de-
fendant's conduct is outweighed by the harm it causes the plaintiff. 64 
Thus, a defendant's conduct is deemed unreasonable, and there-
fore enjoinable, only if the gravity of harm to the plaintiff, or to the 
public in general in the case of public nuisance, outweighs the useful 
public benefits provided by the defendant's enterprise. 65 It is impor-
tant to note the distinction between the unreasonableness of a de-
fendant's conduct and the unreasonableness of the interference with 
the plaintiff's rights. It is entirely possible that a defendant's conduct 
can create an unreasonable interference, and thus be declared a 
nuisance, yet be of such public benefit that it should not be enjoined. 66 
In such cases, the defendant will be allowed to continue injuring the 
plaintiff, but may have to provide compensation for the injury. 67 
As is generally the case in equity, courts entertaining requests for 
injunctive relief in nuisance actions require a showing that an action 
for damages at law will not provide adequate relief.68 Because equity 
considers every parcel of land to be unique, this requirement can 
60 Id. at 1441-42 nn.171-72. Judges tended to protect industrial property owners by creating 
partial immunities based on statutory authorizations. Also, standards of care were applied 
differently to factories and railroads than they were to individual property owners. Id. 
61 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, § 89, at 637. 
62 See id. § 88A, at 630. 
63 I d. at 631. 
64 Id. 
65 I d. at 630. 
66 See id. at 631. 
67 E.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219,257 N.E.2d 870,309 N.Y.S.2d 604 
(1970). In Boomer, the court found that the public benefit of the defendant's cement plant 
outweighed the harm caused by cement dust drifting onto the plaintiff's property. Thus, 
instead of closing down the cement plant, the defendant was required to pay permanent 
damages equal to the diminution in the value of the plaintiff's property. Id. at 875. 
68 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, § 89, at 640. 
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usually be met by demonstrating that the defendant has seriously 
impaired the usefulness of the plaintiff's property. 69 
In sum, nuisance generally provides legal or equitable remedies 
against defendants who have injured either a private property right 
or a common public right. 70 Although most cases involve existing 
nuisances where the plaintiff has already suffered injury, courts also 
have recognized that activity that only threatens injury may be 
enjoined as an anticipatory nuisance. 71 
B. Anticipatory Nuisance 
Citing the "despotism" inherent to preventing landowners from 
using their property as they please, courts traditionally are reluctant 
to enjoin threatening activity before it causes injury.72 In Holke v. 
Herman,73 for example, the plaintiffs brought an action in anticipa-
tory nuisance to restrain their neighbor from digging a pond they 
feared would fill with sewage. 74 In response, the Missouri Court of 
Appeals stated: 
In most instances the disposition is to wait until the dread is 
justified by the event. Experience has demonstrated that a med-
dlesome, interfering policy represses the spontaneous energy 
and many-sided activity, which arises naturally from self-interest 
and differences of taste and inclination among men and constitute 
the true springs of progress. The spirit of our laws is chary about 
regulating conduct or restricting action. 75 
The H olke court also recognized, however, that the plaintiffs may 
have a cognizable interest in seeking to avoid anticipated harm: 
The reasons for preventing a prospective mischief are at least 
as cogent as those for abating a present one. In the latter in-
stance the courts act more readily because they are sure of their 
ground; the evil is visible. But the call for protection against an 
apprehended injury, reasonably certain to befall, is as imperative 
as that for relief from one now felt. Nor is the complaint required 
to wait until some harm has been experienced . . . . [Such a] 
requirement would make the remedy largely useless . . . .76 
69 [d. Courts may also find adequate grounds for injunctive relief when continuation of the 
defendant's conduct might create a prescriptive easement over the plaintiff's land. [d. 
70 [d. § 86, at 618. 
71 Comment, supra note 6, at 628-29. 
72 See Holke v. Herman, 87 Mo. App. 125, 134--35 (1900). 
73 [d. 
74 [d. at 130--33. 
75 [d. at 135. 
76 [d. at 142. 
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Thus, when deciding anticipatory nuisance actions, courts weigh 
defendants' rights to use their property as they wish against plain-
tiffs' rights to protect themselves and their property from apparent 
threats of injury. 77 Courts have failed, however, to arrive at a single, 
clearly articulated definition of how imminently a defendant's con-
duct must threaten injury to a plaintiff before it can be enjoined. 78 
The strictest courts will only grant prospective injunctions against 
defendants whose conduct can be categorized as nuisance per se. 79 
A nuisance per se is generally defined as conduct that will create a 
nuisance "at all times and under any circumstances, regardless of 
location or surroundings. "80 A few courts describe an activity as 
nuisance per se only if it is illegal, holding for example that a brothel 
is a nuisance per se, but an airport is not.81 
Many courts, however, do not end their analysis with the nuisance 
per se test, but ask in the alternative whether the defendant's con-
duct "necessarily results" in a nuisance. 82 In Purcell v. Davis,83 for 
example, the Montana Supreme Court held that the proposed con-
struction of an oil refinery in a residential neighborhood would not 
constitute a nuisance per se.84 Nevertheless, the court held that the 
defendant's activity could also be enjoined if it necessarily resulted 
in a nuisance. 85 After considering evidence that the refinery would 
be operated so as not to annoy the plaintiffs, the court denied the 
injunction. 86 In another case involving a proposed oil refinery, Com-
merce Oil Refining Corp. v. Miner,87 a federal appellate court simply 
77 [d. at 141. "The doctrine so often stated, that courts of equity are reluctant to restrain a 
threatened nuisance involves the converse proposition, that they will do so when it is apparent 
or extremely probable a nuisance will be created." [d. 
78 Comment, supra note 6, at 632-33. The majority of anticipatory nuisance actions are 
brought in state courts. Thus, most confusion as to how to apply the doctrine has been at the 
state level. Federal courts rarely see anticipatory nuisance cases and therefore have been 
able to develop the doctrine more consistently. [d. 
79 [d. at 630--31. 
80 [d. at 630 (citing Marshall v. Consumers' Power Co., 65 Mich. App. 237, 265-66, 237 
N.W.2d 266,283 (1975». 
81 City of Bowie v. Board of County Comm'rs, 260 Md. 116, 127-28, 271 A.2d 657, 663 
(1970); Comment, supra note 6, at 638--39. But not all illegal conduct can necessarily be termed 
a nuisance per se. Padjen v. Shipley, 553 P.2d 938, 939 (Utah 1976) (holding that violation of 
a local ordinance requiring defendant to keep his dogs 40 feet from plaintiff's home was not 
nuisance per se). 
82 E.g., Purcell v. Davis, 100 Mont. 480, 494, 50 P.2d 255,258 (1935). See generally Comment, 
supra note 6, at 639-40. 
83 100 Mont. 480, 50 P.2d 255. 
84 [d. at 492, 50 P.2d at 257. 
86 [d. at 494, 50 P.2d at 258. 
86 [d. at 491, 50 P.2d at 257. 
87 281 F.2d 465 (1st Cir. 1960). 
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merged the two standards and defined a nuisance per se as that 
which necessarily results in a nuisance. 88 
Other courts, however, eschew the nuisance per se and necessar-
ily-results tests altogether and discuss the standard for enjoining 
anticipatory nuisances in more probabilistic terms. Thus, the H olke 
v. Herman court specifically held that the plaintiffs were required 
to show with reasonable certainty that they would be injured by the 
defendant's proposed pond before an injunction could issue. 89 Like-
wise, in O'Laughlin v. City of Fort Gibson,90 the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court stated a rule requiring clear and convincing evidence of a 
reasonable probability of injury for an injunction to issue against a 
threatened nuisance. 91 Other courts have interpreted the rule in 
terms of certainty of harm,92 the definiteness of injury,93 and the 
immediacy of danger. 94 
Alabama and Georgia, the two states that have codified anticipa-
tory nuisance law, have also defined the test in probabilistic terms. 95 
The Alabama statute states: "Where the consequences of a nuisance 
about to be erected or commenced will be irreparable in damages 
and such consequences are not merely possible but to a reasonable 
degree certain, a court may interfere to arrest a nuisance before it 
is completed."96 The Georgia statute is almost identical, requiring 
irreparable injury that "is not merely possible but to a reasonable 
degree certain. "97 
These statutes and the case law described above may not evince 
a single clearcut standard for the enjoining of anticipatory nuisances, 
but they generally do require plaintiffs to show a high probability of 
injury before receiving relief.98 Furthermore, in deciding anticipa-
88 Id. at 474 (applying Rhode Island law). 
89 Holke v. Hennan, 87 Mo. App. 125, 141 (1900). The Boike court did not rule on whether 
the pond was in fact enjoinable, but found there was enough evidence to argue the claim and 
ruled that the plaintiffs could amend their complaint. Id. at 142. 
90 389 P.2d 506 (Okla. 1964). 
91 Id. at 509 (court found no reasonable probability that plaintiff would be injured by 
defendant's proposed sewage treatment facility). 
92 Pennsylvania Co. for Insurance v. Sun Co., 290 Pa. 404, 413, 138 A. 909, 912 (1927). 
93 Lauderdale County Bd. ofEduc. v. Alexander, 269 Ala. 79,85,110 So. 2d 911, 916 (1959). 
94 Fink v. Board of Trustees of S. Ill. Univ., 71 Ill. App. 2d 276, 281, 218 N.E.2d 240, 244 
(1966). 
95 See ALA. CODE § 6-5-125 (1975); GA. CODE ANN. § 41-2-4 (Harrison 1980). 
!16 ALA. CODE § 6-5-125. 
97 GA. CODE ANN. § 41-2-4. For a more detailed analysis of how courts have applied the 
Georgia and Alabama statutes, see Comment, supm note 6, at 645-48. 
98 PROSSER & KEETON, supm note 3, § 89, at 640-41. This treatise summarizes the general 
rule most succinctly: "The defendant may be restrained from entering upon an activity where 
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tory nuisance actions, courts focus exclusively on the probability of 
injury to a plaintiff and do not consider the magnitude of a threatened 
injury. 99 
Consequently, unless they can show they almost certainly will be 
injured by a defendant's conduct, it usually will be difficult for plain-
tiffs to prevail in an anticipatory nuisance action. 100 Also, presumably 
because few plaintiffs meet the initial burden of showing a high 
probability of injury, courts rarely apply the balancing ofthe equities 
test generally required in injunctive nuisance actions. 101 Plaintiffs, 
therefore, are denied the opportunity to have their interest in not 
being injured weighed against the social utility of the defendant's 
conduct. 102 As a result, a plaintiff confronting a low-probability risk 
of catastrophic harm created by conduct of little social utility will 
have no remedy prior to injury. 
IV. ARTICULATING A MODERN STANDARD FOR THE ENJOINING OF 
FUTURE HARM: PROBABILITY OF HARM VERSUS MAGNITUDE OF 
HARM 
The vagueness of anticipatory nuisance law, reSUlting in an un-
predictability of application, may be one reason why the doctrine is 
under-utilized by plaintiffs. 103 It is not unusual, for instance, for 
courts to decide anticipatory nuisance cases without identifying any 
applicable rule or case precedent. 104 Also, the standards espoused 
by courts, though often unclear, generally require plaintiffs to shoul-
der the enormous burden of proving that a defendant's conduct will 
very probably, or almost certainly, injure them. 105 Thus, anticipatory 
nuisance doctrine as applied by courts usually favors defendants who 
it is highly probable that it will lead to a nuisance, although if the possibility is merely 
uncertain or contingent he may be left to his remedy of damages until after the nuisance has 
occurred." Id. For a more detailed discussion of what tests courts have used in anticipatory 
nuisance analysis, see generally Comment, supra note 6. 
99 See, e.g., Purcell v. Davis, 100 Mont. 480, 494, 50 P.2d 255, 258 (1935); Commerce Oil 
Ref. Corp. v. Miner, 281 F.2d 465, 474 (1st Cir. 1960); O'Laughlin v. City of Fort Gibson, 389 
P.2d 506, 509 (Okla. 1964). 
100 See supra note 99. 
101 Supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text. 
102 See supra note 99. 
103 Comment, supra note 6, at 632. 
104 See, e.g., Turner v. City of Spokane, 39 Wash. 2d 332, 235 P.2d 300 (1951). In Turner, 
the court refused to enjoin a proposed rock-crushing plant, citing no rule, stating only that 
the threat to plaintiffs was "not of sufficient imminence." [d. at 335, 235 P.2d at 30l. 
105 See Commerce Oil Ref. Corp. v. Miner, 281 F.2d 465, 474 (1st Cir. 1960); Comment, 
supra note 6, at 632. 
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create risk and disfavors plaintiffs who must bear it. As a result, 
productive and technologically intensive uses of land will often be 
preferred over passive, more environmentally neutral uses. 106 
Another reason why anticipatory nuisance doctrine is generally 
undeveloped and little used is that there have been, until recently, 
relatively few fact situations that genuinely warrant such a preemp-
tive remedy. Early industrial technology often creates effects that 
may annoy or injure people, but it is less likely to cause truly 
irreparable damage. Many courts denying relief in anticipatory nuis-
ance actions have noted that, even if the threatened injuries do occur, 
the plaintiffs will still be able to seek an effective remedy after 
suffering harm. 107 
As technology continues to evolve, however, and more threats of 
potentially catastrophic harm manifest themselves, plaintiffs are 
more likely to find themselves confronted with threats of injury that 
cannot be addressed adequately after the fact.108 In the Man-Bug 
scenario described in section I, for example, if Ice-Ten does in fact 
turn the plaintiffs' farms and homes into arctic tundra, a post-injury 
injunction will be useless and an award of damages probably will 
provide an inadequate remedy.109 If indeed Ice-Ten is capable of 
turning the entire planet into a frozen ice-ball, the notion of a post-
injury remedy becomes altogether absurd. 110 
In situations such as these, where there is a small probability of 
injury that is potentially unlimited or irreversible, the traditional 
anticipatory nuisance analysis that favors defendants' conduct be-
comes entirely ineffective. Because the traditional test requires a 
high probability of injury and ignores the magnitude of the threat-
ened harm, such low-probability risks of enormous injury cannot be 
addressed rationally.111 In a few cases, courts have confronted the 
inherent irrationality of weighing plaintiffs' and defendants' interests 
106 See generally, e.g., Hays v. Hartfield L-P Gas, 159 Ind. App. 297, 306 N.E.2d 373 (1974) 
(no injunction against 30,000 gallon propane tank within 300 feet of plaintiff's home); Turner, 
39 Wash. 2d 332, 235 P.2d 300 (no injunction against rock-crushing plant in residential area); 
Purcell v. Davis, 100 Mont. 480, 50 P.2d 255 (1935) (no injunction against oil refinery 430 feet 
from plaintiff's home). 
107 E.g., Wood v. Town of Wilton, 156 Conn. 304, 312, 240 A.2d 904, 908 (1968) (plaintiffs 
may receive injunction if proposed dump in residential area later creates a nuisance); Hays, 
159 Ind. App. at 303, 306 N.E.2d at 377 (plaintiffs may enjoin proposed propane tank if it 
later creates a nuisance); Turner, 39 Wash. 2d. at 337-38, 235 P.2d at 303 (plaintiffs may 
enjoin proposed rock-crushing plant if it later creates a nuisance). 
108 See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text. 
109 See id. 
llO See id. 
III See Comment, supra note 6, at 641-42. 
1990] ANTICIPATORY NUISANCE 457 
without considering the extent of the harm a plaintiff might suffer 
and have attempted to devise a more equitable means of assessing 
risks of future harm. 112 
A. Defining Risk in Terms of Present Fear 
One way in which courts have abrogated the limitations of antic-
ipatory nuisance doctrine has been to ask whether the threat of 
future injury so frightens plaintiffs as to create a current injury.113 
By defining risk in terms of present fear rather than future injury, 
courts can take a case out of anticipatory nuisance altogether and 
issue injunctions without plaintiffs showing a high probability of 
harm.114 The key requirement in such cases is that the fear of injury 
must interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of a plaintiff's prop-
erty.115 
An early case, Tyner v. People's Gas Co.,l16 provides a stark 
illustration of the logic of this approach. The plaintiff in Tyner sought 
an injunction against a neighbor who had stored large quantities of 
nitroglycerin on his property and proposed to use it to "shoot" nat-
ural gas wells dug within 200 feet of the plaintiff's residence.ll7 The 
Indiana Supreme Court did not consider at all whether this activity 
could be conducted safely, but noted simply "that an explosion of 
sixty to one hundred quarts [of nitroglycerin] at any given place on 
the surface of the earth could and probably would destroy life and 
property anywhere within five hundred yards of such explosion."118 
The court summarily granted an injunction, stating only that "[t]o 
live in constant apprehension of death from the explosion of nitro-
glycerin is certainly an interference with the comfortable enjoyment 
of life. "119 
Clearly, the Tyner court focused on the magnitude of the potential 
injury, a tremendous explosion, rather than the probability of its 
taking place. 12o Courts have used the same approach in situations 
where plaintiffs were confronted with more ambiguous, less graphic 
112 See Ferry v. City of Seattle, 116 Wash. 661, 667, 203 P. 40, 42 (1922); Village of Wilsonville 
v. SCA Services, Inc., 86 Ill. 2d 1, 37-38, 426 N.E.2d 824,842 (1981) (Ryan, J., concurring). 
113 E.g., Stotler v. Rochelle, 83 Kan. 86, 91, 109 P. 788, 790 (1910). 
114 See id. 
115Id. 
116 131 Ind. 408, 31 N.E. 61 (1892). 
117Id. at 408-09, 31 N.E. at 61. 
118Id. at 410, 31 N.E. at 61. 
119Id. at 412, 31 N.E. at 62. 
120 See id. 
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threats of injury. In Stotler v. Rochelle,121 for example, the Kansas 
Supreme Court upheld an injunction in favor of a plaintiff who feared 
that the establishment of a cancer hospital seventy-eight feet from 
his home might lead to the infection of himself and his family. 122 
Acknowledging that science at that time could not substantiate the 
plaintiff's fears, the court refused to frame the question before it in 
terms of "a mere academic inquiry as to whether the disease is in 
fact highly or remotely contagious."l23 Instead, the court asked 
"whether, in view of the general dread inspired by the disease, the 
reasonable enjoyment of [plaintiff's] property would not be materi-
ally interfered with. "124 
In Everett v. Paschall,125 the Washington Supreme Court also 
cited an interference with the comfortable enjoyment of property as 
its basis for enjoining the continued operation of a tuberculosis san-
itarium next to the plaintiff's home. 126 Here, again, the plaintiff 
feared he and his family might contract the disease because of the 
proximity of the facility.127 The Everett court held that "comfortable 
enjoyment" must be defined according to the facts of each case and 
should take into account "notions of comfort and convenience enter-
tained by persons generally of ordinary tastes and susceptibili-
ties."l28 
121 83 Kan. 86, 109 P. 788 (1910). 
122 ld. at 86-87, 109 P. at 788. 
123 ld. at 91, 109 P. at 790. 
124 ld. 
125 61 Wash. 47, 111 P. 879 (1910). 
1261d. at 51-52, 111 P. at 881. Note that the sanitarium here was already operating, while 
the cancer hospital in Stotler had not yet been established. Stotler, 83 Kan. at 86, 109 P. at 
788. One interesting feature of the comfortable enjoyment doctrine is that, once a court has 
acceded to the assessment of risk in terms of fear, the distinction between a threat currently 
in place and one not yet established becomes irrelevant. In other words, courts seem to 
assume that fear will result from the proposed activity and proceed to analyze the problem in 
terms of a present nuisance. Compare, e.g., Goodrich v. Starrett, 108 Wash. 437, 184 P. 220 
(1919) (injunction against existing funeral home which plaintiffs feared would spread disease) 
with Bragg v. Ives, 149 Va. 482, 140 S.E. 656 (1927) (injunction against proposed funeral 
home on same grounds). This assumption may be particularly significant in actions against 
proposed activity that may be more or less likely to inflict harm if it is or is not conducted 
negligently. See, e.g., Densmore v. Evergreen Camp, No. 147, Woodmen of the World, 61 
Wash. 230, 231-32, 112 P. 255, 255 (1910) (court declined to consider defendant's assertion 
that proposed funeral home would be operated safely). 
127 Everett, 61 Wash. at 48, 111 P. at 879. 
128 ld. at 51-52, 111 P. at 881. An ancillary question raised by the Everett decision and 
others following it is whether or not the protection of comfortable enjoyment follows from a 
common-law or statutory definition of nuisance. ld. at 50, 111 P. at 880; see also. Ferry v. City 
of Seattle, 116 Wash. 661, 664, 203 P. 40, 41 (1922). The Everett court, and those citing it as 
controlling within the same jurisdiction, apparently did not believe their reliance on the concept 
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Some courts, when enjoining interferences with the comfortable 
enjoyment of property, have focused on the plaintiff's fear to such 
an extent as to virtually ignore evidence showing there is no prob-
ability of harm. 129 In City of Baltimore v. Fairfield Improvement 
Co. of Baltimore, 130 for example, the court prohibited the city from 
housing a single leper in a residential area, even while acknowledging 
there was little or no scientific probability of contagion. 131 In reaching 
its conclusion, the court embarked on a long dissertation on the 
social history of leprosy, stating that "[t]he horror of its contagion 
is as deep-seated today as it was more than 2,000 years ago ... 
[and] cannot, in this day, be shaken or dispelled by mere scientific 
asseveration. "132 
The Fairfield Improvement decision is probably best viewed as an 
aberrational reaction to a widely shared irrational fear. The extrem-
ity of the court's position is analogous to language used by the 
Everett court when it confronted scientific evidence that tuberculosis 
was probably not highly contagious: "The question is, not whether 
the fear is founded in science, but whether it exists; not whether it 
is imaginary, but whether it is real, in that it affects the movements 
of comfortable enjoyment was supported at common law, but only by the Washington legis-
lature's definition of nuisance as "unlawfully doing an act or omitting to perform a duty, which 
act or omission either annoys, injures or endangers the comfort, repose, health or safety of 
others." 61 Wash. at 50, 111 P. at 880 (citing REM. AND BAL. CODE, § 8309); see also Ferry, 
116 Wash. at 664, 203 P. at 41 (citing same). It is clear, however, that interference with the 
enjoyment of property has generally been termed a nuisance at common law. See PROSSER & 
KEETON, supra note 3, § 87, at 619-20; RESTATEMENT, supra note 54, § 821D. Furthermore, 
the Everett court itself cites with approval the Stotler decision, handed down only five months 
earlier in another jurisdiction, which based its holding entirely on common-law precedent. 
Everett, 61 Wash. at 53, 111 P. at 881; see also Stotler, 83 Kan. at 88-91, 109 P. at 789-90. 
Some courts, however, have shown themselves plainly hostile to using comfortable enjoy-
ment doctrine to issue preemptive injunctions. See, e.g., O'Laughlin v. City of Fort Gibson, 
389 P.2d 506, 509 (Okla. 1964) (no injunction against proposed sewage treatment facility); 
Nicholson v. Connecticut Halfway House, Inc., 153 Conn. 507, 510-11, 218 A.2d 383, 385-86 
(1966) (no injunction against proposed boarding house for state prison parolees). Such courts 
note the precedent established by cases like Stotler and Everett, but refuse to follow it, citing 
instead the conventional anticipatory nuisance rule that there must be a "clear and convincing" 
probability of injury. O'Laughlin, 389 P.2d at 509. These cases tend to involve situations 
where the evidence weighs heavily against irreparable harm taking place, or where the 
threatened harm itself is of such a compensable nature that the court is willing to wait and 
see if it takes place. E.g., id. Courts declining to follow such decisions as Stotler, however, 
have sometimes conceded that an injunction against a threat of future injury on the basis of 
the fear it creates may be appropriate in "extreme" situations. [d. 
129 City of Baltimore v. Fairfield Improvement Co. of Baltimore, 87 Md. 352, 364-66, 39 A. 
1081, 1084 (1898). 
130 87 Md. 352, 39 A. 108I. 
131 [d. at 365, 39 A. at 1084. 
132 [d. 
460 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 17:441 
and conduct of men. "133 Even so, the Everett court did not go so far 
as to make such a sweeping pronouncement the sole basis of its 
injunction against the tuberculosis sanitarium. 134 Instead, it noted 
there was evidence in the record of a small risk of the disease being 
spread by flies or through the negligence of nurses and patients. 136 
"Under the facts," the court concluded, "we cannot say that the 
dread which is the disquieting element upon which plaintiffs' com-
plaint is made to rest is unreal, imaginary, or fanciful. "136 
Thus, in cases where courts are willing to enjoin a threat of future 
harm on the basis of the fear it creates, they have generally required 
that the fear be reasonable. 137 In determining whether a plaintiff's 
fear is reasonable, however, courts have tended to conduct a liberal 
inquiry, asking not whether the probability is high or low, but simply 
whether there is evidence of any probability at all. 138 It therefore 
might be argued that a cause of action based on a plaintiff's fear of 
injury, even when such fear must be reasonable, goes too far in 
abrogating the standard anticipatory nuisance rule requiring a high 
probability of harm. 139 To move from one extreme where the mag-
nitude of harm may be wholly ignored in assessing risk, to another 
in which even the slightest probability of harm may be deemed 
sufficient to support an injunction, hardly seems a step toward true 
equity. 
There is, however, precedent demonstrating how courts might 
narrowly tailor their use of the reasonable fear concept so as to 
specifically address the limitations of anticipatory nuisance doctrine 
without reaching too far in the opposite direction. In Ferry v. City 
of Seattle, 140 the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief against the con-
133 Everett v. Paschall, 61 Wash. 47, 51, 111 P. 879, 880 (1910). 
134 See id. at 52-53, III P. at 88l. 
135 [d. 
136 [d. 
137 E.g., Stotler v. Rochelle, 83 Kan. 86, 91, 109 P. 788, 790 (1910) (question is whether 
plaintiffs have a reasonable ground upon which to base fears of contagion). 
138 Compare Goodrich v. Starrett, 108 Wash. 437, 439-42, 184 P. 220, 221-22 (1919) (court 
enjoined funeral home where evidence indicated some chance of infection) with Dean v. Powell 
Undertaking Co., 55 Cal. App. 545, 548, 203 P. 1015, 1017 (1922) (no injunction against funeral 
home where plaintiff asserted only that he was depressed by its presence and introduced no 
evidence of a threat of contagion); see also Hays v. Hartfield L-P Gas, 159 Ind. App. 297, 
301, 306 N.E.2d 373, 376 (1974) (injunction denied because plaintiff failed to introduce any 
evidence that propane gas tank adjacent to his home might actually explode). But see Tyner 
v. People's Gas Co., 131 Ind. 408, 31 N.E. 61 (1892) (injunction against storage and use of 
nitroglycerin with no discussion or evidence of probability of explosion). 
139 See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
140 116 Wash. 648, 200 P. 336 (1921). 
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struction of a small reservoir on a hillside immediately above their 
homes, claiming they feared for their lives should the embankment 
supporting the reservoir break open.141 Upon first hearing the case, 
the Supreme Court of Washington refused to issue an injunction, 
citing the standard rule in anticipatory nuisance requiring a high 
probability of injury and noting that the weight of the evidence 
showed the reservoir would be constructed safely.142 "The test is, 
not what may possibly occur," wrote the court, "but what may be 
reasonably expected to happen. "143 
Upon rehearing the case little more than four months later, 144 
however, the court dramatically reversed itself and issued an in-
junction on the basis of the plaintiffs' fears creating an interference 
with the reasonable enj oyment of their property. 145 Although it noted 
that the plaintiffs had introduced some evidence to show a small 
probability of the embankment breaking, the court did not find that 
this fact alone meant the plaintiffs' fears were reasonable. 146 Instead, 
the court stated: "the question of reasonableness . . . turns again, 
not only on the probable breaking of the reservoir, but the realization 
of the extent of the injury which would certainly ensue; that is to 
say the court will look to consequences in determining whether the 
fear existing is reasonable. "147 
Most striking of all is a separate concurrence by Chief Justice 
Parker, the key swing vote, in which he explained the reason for his 
change of heart: 
If the breaking of the proposed reservoir would probably result 
in comparatively small damage and no loss of life, I would not 
demand proof of its safety with a high degree of certainty; but, 
in view of what now seems to me would be the appalling result 
of such breaking, I would want the necessity of its location there, 
and its safety, to be proven beyond all doubt, before withholding 
the injunctive relief prayed for. 148 
Thus, the Ferry decision is a compelling example of how a court in 
equity, using the concepts of reasonable fear and comfortable enjoy-
ment, can fashion a rational and equitable standard of risk assess-
1411d. at 655-56, 200 P. at 339. 
1421d. at 658-59, 200 P. at 340. 
1431d. 
144 Ferry v. City of Seattle, 116 Wash. 661, 203 P. 40 (1922) (the case was first heard on 
Aug. 29, 1921, then reheard on Jan. 3, 1922). 
145 ld. at 662-63, 203 P. at 40. 
1461d. 
1471d. 
1481d. at 667, 203 P. at 42. 
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ment that is value-neutral and favors neither plaintiffs nor defen-
dants. 149 By weighing both the probability and magnitude of harm 
in relation to one another, the Ferry court addressed the most se-
rious deficiencies of traditional anticipatory nuisance doctrinel50 and 
arrived at a formula that effectively evaluates threats of future 
harm. 
B. The Limitations of Assessing Risk with Fear 
Depending as they do upon a unique emotional response to threat-
ened danger, the thin line of cases espousing reasonable-fear analysis 
do not provide a broad enough base for reforming traditional judicial 
assessment of modern risk scenarios. The limitations of reasonable-
fear analysis are clearly illustrated by the nature of the actions in 
which it has evolved. 
For example, all the cases cited above involved situations in which 
plaintiffs complained of interferences with the enjoyment of their 
homes and sought to enjoin in private nuisance the intrusion of 
dangerous activities into areas that were strictly residential. 151 It is 
therefore open to question whether courts would be as solicitous of 
plaintiffs' fears in situations where the enjoyment disturbed did not 
involve the home. 152 
An additional limitation on using reasonable-fear analysis as the 
basis for preemptive injunctions is that there is no case precedent 
applying the doctrine in public nuisance. 153 It may be possible to 
couch an argument in terms of a public fear so pervasive that it 
interferes with the public's enjoyment of its interests, but such an 
argument would find little support in the private nuisance actions 
brought by homeowners in the cases above. 154 
149 See id. 
150 See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text. 
151 See supra notes 116-48 and accompanying text. 
152 See Blackburn v. Bishop, 299 S. W. 264, 271 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927). The extra vigilance 
with which this court was willing to guard the plaintiff's interest in his home was manifest in 
its description of that interest: 
During all recorded time, man has enveloped the home with a sanctity that is not 
given to any other place on earth . . . . 
Always 'home' has meant peace and contentment, and man's rest under his own 
vine and fig tree are symbolical of such a condition. Holy Writ gives us such a picture 
when it says: 'Judah and Israel dwelt safely, every man under his vine and under his 
fig tree from Dan even unto Beersheba, all the days of Solomon.' 
[d. (citing 1 Kings 4:25). 
153 For a brief explanation of public nuisance, see supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text. 
154 See supra notes 116-48 and accompanying text. 
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Finally, as was true in the anticipatory nuisance cases discussed 
above,155 courts applying reasonable-fear doctrine tend to omit the 
balancing-of-the-equities test generally required in injunctive nuis-
ance cases. 156 In anticipatory nuisance actions, this omission means 
that plaintiffs often are denied injunctions without having their in-
terest in not being injured weighed against the social utility of the 
defElndant's conduct. 157 In the context of reasonable-fear analysis, it 
results in a defendant's conduct being enjoined without its social 
utility being weighed against the plaintiff's interests. l58 
In sum, courts have successfully used reasonable-fear analysis to 
take account of the magnitude of injuries threatening plaintiffs. 159 
Its application, however, has been restricted exclusively to private 
nuisance actions involving residential property. The scope of reason-
able-fear analysis, therefore, seems too limited to address all modern 
technological risk scenarios that may arise. 160 Furthermore, because 
reasonable-fear analysis generally favors plaintiffs by often allowing 
injunctions to issue against any low-probability threat of injury and 
by failing to take account of the social utility of a defendant's conduct, 
it may unreasonably hinder technological progress. 
C. Defining the Risk in Terms of Probability and Magnitude 
Although most courts seeking to evade the strictures of traditional 
anticipatory nuisance doctrine have focused on the plaintiff's fear to 
obviate the need for a showing of a high probability of harm,161 a 
few courts have addressed the doctrine's deficiencies in a more 
straightforward manner.162 These courts, unlike the Ferry v. City of 
Seattle court, have not considered the issues of probability and mag-
nitude of injury in relation to the tangential question of whether the 
155 See supra notes 79-90 and accompanying text. 
156 See Stotler v. Rochelle, 83 Kan. 86, 109 P. 788 (1910); Everett v. Paschall, 61 Wash. 47, 
111 P. 879 (1910). For an explanation of balancing of the equities as applied in nuisance, see 
supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text. 
157 See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text. 
158 See supra note 156. 
159 See Ferry v. City of Seattle, 116 Wash. 661, 662-63, 203 P. 40, 40 (1922). 
160 In the Man-Bug scenario, for example, homeowners threatened by the Ice-Ten tests 
would be able to seek injunctions on the basis of the reasonable-fear precedent, but farmers 
or commercial property owners would be unable to do so. See supra notes 1-2 and accom-
panying text. 
161 See supra notes 116-48 and accompanying text. 
162 See, e.g., Harris Stanley Coal & Land Co. v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 154 F.2d 450 
(6th Cir. 1946); Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Services, Inc., 86 Ill. 2d 1, 37-38, 426 N.E.2d 
824,842 (1981) (Ryan, J., concurring). 
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plaintiff's present fear of injury is reasonable, but instead have tried 
to consider them in the context of anticipatory nuisance doctrine 
itself. 163 
The case of Harris Stanley Coal & Land Co. v. Chesapeake & 
Ohio Railway CO.,164 for example, confronted a federal appellate 
court was confronted with a mine operator seeking to reopen a closed 
coal mine on a steep mountainside approximately 100 feet above a 
rail line servicing both passengers and freight.165 The railroad op-
erating the line sought to enjoin the mining company from removing 
pillars of coal left to provide support in the old mine, alleging that 
their removal would create a risk of a landslide onto the railroad 
tracks below. 166 The trial court had declined to issue a preemptive 
injunction, stating only that the possibility of injury to passengers 
on a passing train "would require a coincidence of events that can 
hardly be raised to the status of probability. "167 
On appeal, however, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals was will-
ing to take a broader view of the nature of the risk presented. 168 
Although it conceded that the rail line was not heavily traveled and 
there was thus little chance of a landslide occurring just as a train 
passed, the appellate court nevertheless found a compelling reason 
to issue the injunction: 
[T]he effect of a substantial mountain slide upon a passing train 
might well be catastrophic. It may be that such a disaster could 
occur only upon a concatenation of circumstances of not too great 
probability, and that the odds are against it. It is common ex-
perience, however, that catastrophes occur at unexpected times 
and in unforeseen places. The pictorial exhibits graphically depict 
the steep face of the cliff behind which the pillars stand, and its 
proximity to the railway tracks, and it is indeed bold prophecy 
which denies the threatened danger. A court of equity will not 
gamble with human life, at whatever odds, and for loss of life 
there is no remedy that in an equitable sense is adequate. 169 
The Sixth Circuit thus assessed risk in a decisive and direct manner, 
weighing the probability of a landslide occurring while a train was 
passing against the quantity of harm such a landslide would create. 170 
163 See Hams Stanley, 154 F.2d at 453. 
164 154 F.2d 450. 
165 Id. at 451. 
166 Id. at 452. 
167Id. 
168 See id. at 453. 
169Id. 
170 See id. 
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Although the court cited no precedent for its analysis and did not 
mention the traditional rule of anticipatory nuisance requiring a high 
probability of harm, its reasoning nevertheless seems intuitively 
rational. 171 
Village of Wilsonville v. SeA Services, Inc. 172 illustrates the prob-
lems a court may encounter when it attempts to assess risk rationally 
while confronting the traditional anticipatory nuisance standard 
more consciously than did the Harris Stanley court. In Wilsonville, 
the plaintiffs brought suit in public nuisance to enjoin the continued 
operation of a hazardous waste landfill adjacent to their village. 173 
The landfill, which was licensed by the Illinois Environmental Pro-
tection Agency and was required to obtain additional permits each 
time toxic waste was delivered to the site, was located over an 
abandoned mine site. 174 The plaintiffs contended that there was a 
risk the abandoned mine would create subsidence in the area, causing 
the clay-lined trenches filled with toxic waste to break open and 
contaminate soil and groundwater. 175 The plaintiffs also contended 
that the landfill operator had stored incompatible chemicals together 
in the same trenches, and that, if subsidence caused the trenches to 
break open, these chemicals might combine and ignite, sparking fires 
and explosions that would emit toxic vapors and fumes. 176 
The trial court held that the landfill constituted a nuisance per se 
and ordered the defendant to close the site and remove all toxic 
waste from the area.177 On appeal, the defendant asserted that the 
weight of the evidence was against the trial court's finding and that 
the landfill therefore could not be enjoined as a prospective nuis-
ance. 178 In evaluating the trial court's decision, the Illinois Appellate 
171 See id. Furthermore, the facts of the Harris Stanley case do not lend themselves to 
treatment through the reasonable-fear analysis. Although the railroad may indeed entertain 
reasonable fears as to the safety of its trains, freight, and passengers, it is difficult to assert 
that this fear somehow interferes with the railroad's "comfortable enjoyment" of its track. 
See supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
172 86 Ill. 2d 1, 426 N.E.2d 824 (1981). 
173 [d. at 6, 426 N.E.2d at 826-27. 
174 [d. at 7, 426 N.E.2d at 827. 
175 [d. at 10-11, 426 N.E.2d at 829. The landfill site drained toward the south, away from 
the village itself, but toward nearby farmland. Although most of the village's water supply 
was purchased from another town, there were several springs and wells in the area, which 
were used to water gardens, livestock, and pets. At least two residents were using, or planned 
to use, local groundwater for drinking purposes. [d. at 8, 426 N.E.2d at 828. 
176 [d. at 12-13, 426 N.E.2d at 830. 
177 Village of Wilsonville v. SeA Services, Inc., 77 Ill. App. 3d 618, 622, 396 N.E.2d 552, 
553-54 (1979). 
178 [d. 
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Court acknowledged that the traditional standard for enjoining a 
threat of future harm required a high probability of injury.179 It 
found, however, that the rule could be abrogated in this case, stating 
"we do not deem it necessary here that the evidence clearly show 
that the harm envisioned by plaintiffs' witnesses will 'necessarily 
result' in order for the danger presented by the existence and op-
eration of the landfill to be a basis for the injunction. "180 The court 
conceded that the evidence of toxic contamination was uncertain, 
but concluded "that the trier of fact could have determined that 
there was a reasonable likelihood that escape would take place some 
time in the future. "181 
Thus, although the appellate court's reliance upon a "reasonable 
likelihood" of injury allowed it to abrogate the traditional require-
ment of a high probability of injury, the court failed to state explicitly 
how it was applying the standard and what factors should be consid-
ered. 182 Furthermore, the court did not explain why it ignored the 
traditional anticipatory nuisance standard. Although it seemed to 
suggest the facts of the case warranted a departure from the old 
rule,183 the court did not identify which elements of the evidence 
made this departure necessary. 
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Illinois, the defendant in 
Wilsonville again claimed that the weight of the evidence did not 
show a high probability of toxic contamination and charged that the 
lower courts had applied the wrong legal standard in enjoining the 
operation of the landfill. l84 While the Supreme Court upheld the 
injunction, it implicitly rejected the appellate court's reasoning. 185 
Although the appellate court had been willing to abrogate the tra-
ditional anticipatory nuisance rule, the Supreme Court agreed with 
the defendant's contention that the traditional rule requiring a high 
probability of harm was applicable in this case. 186 The Supreme Court 
arrived at the same result as the appellate court, however, by finding 
that it was "highly probable" contamination would occur at the waste 
disposal site. 187 
179Id. at 633, 396 N.E.2d at 562. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. at 634-35, 396 N.E.2d at 563. 
182 See id. 
183 See id. at 633, 396 N.E.2d at 562. 
184 Village of Wilsonville v. SeA Services, Inc., 86 Ill. 2d 1, 14,426 N.E.2d 824, 830 (1981). 
185 See id. at 25-26, 426 N.E.2d at 836. 
186Id. 
187Id. at 26-27, 426 N.E.2d at 836-37. 
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The contradiction in reasoning between the two courts illustrates 
how the traditional anticipatory nuisance rule can distort judicial 
analysis when applied to modern technological risk assessment scen-
arios. The evidence in Wilsonville was very technical, with numerous 
experts for both sides offering contradictory but apparently com-
petent evidence on such esoteric matters as the likelihood of ground 
subsidence, the permeability of the soil and the characteristics of 
the various chemicals deposited at the site. 188 The presentation of 
this evidence at trial took 104 days and created a record over 13,000 
pages in length. 189 
As such, it would appear difficult to argue with the appellate 
court's characterization of the evidence of probability of injury as 
uncertain. 190 It thus seems somewhat disingenuous of the Illinois 
Supreme Court to have characterized the probability of injury as 
being so high that it satisfied the traditional standard for anticipatory 
nuisance injunctions. 191 The appellate court, on the other hand, while 
properly appraising the probability of harm, was either unwilling or 
unable to identify those instances in which the traditional doctrine 
should be abrogated. 192 The appellate court also failed to clearly 
articulate what standard should be substituted in place of the original 
rule. 193 
The appellate and Supreme Court decisions in Wilsonville thus 
generate confusion as to how courts should approach modern risk 
assessment scenarios involving low-probability threats of potentially 
catastrophic or irreversible harm. Justice Ryan, however, in a con-
currence to the Supreme Court opinion, offered an alternative to the 
188 [d. at 10, 426 N.E.2d at 828. 
189 [d. at 6-7, 426 N.E.2d at 827. Also, the case was tried in an emotionally and politically 
charged atmosphere. Rudolph, Recent Decisions, Environmental Law/Nuisance, 70 ILL. B.J. 
586 (May 1982). Residents of the village, some of them armed, threatened drivers transporting 
waste to the site and urged that the landfill be blown up or the road to it blockaded. The state 
Attorney General also filed suit in the case, siding with the plaintiffs against both the defendant 
and the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, thus continuing a running feud between 
the two offices. Finally, a number of local officials involved in the matter, including the state's 
attorney prosecuting the case and the trial judge, were up for reelection. [d. at 588. 
190 See supra note 181 and accompanying text. Furthermore, the Illinois EPA participated 
in all stages of the litigation and urged throughout that the landfill could be operated safely 
and should not be closed. Rudolph, supra note 189, at 586. Though an agency's word need 
not be taken as gospel, it seems unlikely that the Illinois EPA would militate actively in favor 
of the landfill remaining open if it was in fact highly likely to contaminate the area. 
191 See Village of Wilsonville, 86 Ill. 2d at 26-27, 426 N.E.2d at 836-37. 
192 See Village of Wilsonville v. SeA Services, Inc., 77 Ill. App. 3d 618, 633, 396 N.E.2d 
552, 562 (1979). 
193 [d. 
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traditional anticipatory nuisance standard that is both simple and 
straightforward. 194 
Although Justice Ryan agreed with the majority that the evidence 
in Wilsonville met the traditional standard's requirement of a high 
probability of injury, he nevertheless argued that the standard itself 
was "unnecessarily narrow. "195 Instead, he suggested that a test 
balancing both probability and magnitude of injury would be more 
appropriate: 
If the harm that may result is severe, a lesser possibility of its 
occurring should be required to support injunctive relief. Con-
versely, if the potential harm is less severe, a greater possibility 
that it will happen should be required. . . . This balancing test 
allows the court to consider a wider range of factors and avoids 
the anomalous result possible under a more restrictive alterna-
tive where a person engaged in an ultrahazardous activity with 
potentially catastrophic results would be allowed to continue 
until he has driven an entire community to the brink of certain 
disaster. A court of equity need not wait so long to provide 
relief. 196 
In essence, Justice Ryan's proposed standard is identical to the test 
applied by the court in Ferry v. City of Seattle. 197 The difference is 
that here it would be applied directly to the assessment of risk in 
anticipatory nuisance and not merely to an assessment of the rea-
sonableness of the plaintiff's fear.198 
V. REFORMING ANTICIPATORY NUISANCE DOCTRINE 
This Comment suggests that Justice Ryan's standard, balancing 
probability and magnitude of harm against one another, should en-
tirely supplant the traditional anticipatory nuisance standard re-
quiring a high probability of harm. Courts should apply this new 
balancing test in all cases where plaintiffs seek to enjoin threats of 
future injury in nuisance. 
When considering whether or not to grant an injunction against 
an alleged anticipatory nuisance under this proposed test, courts 
should follow a three-step analysis. First, as in any case involving 
an injunction, the court should ask if the threatened injury is in fact 
irreparable at law and cannot be properly compensated with dam-
194 See Village of Wilsonville, 86 Ill.2d at 37-38,426 N.E.2d at 842. (Ryan, J., concurring). 
195 [d. 
196 [d. 
197 See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text. 
198 See id. 
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ages after the fact.199 If so, the court should next assess the risk of 
injury, asking if the magnitude of the threatened injury outweighs 
the probability of its occurring. As indicated by Justice Ryan in his 
concurrence in Wilsonville, this is an inverse balancing test-as the 
magnitude of the harm increases, the lesser the probability required 
for an injunction to issue. 2oo Conversely, as the probability increases, 
a lesser magnitude of harm will justify injunctive relief. 201 Finally, 
as is already the rule in nuisance generally, the court should balance 
the equities of the case, measuring the utility of the defendant's 
conduct and its potential benefit to society against the plaintiff's 
interest in receiving an injunction. 202 
In giving weight to both the probability and magnitude of harm, 
the proposed test is closely analogous to the familiar risk assessment 
formula for establishing negligence espoused by Judge Learned 
Hand in United States v. Carroll Towing CO.203 According to Judge 
Hand's formula, liability in negligence will be found if the probability 
of harm multiplied by the gravity of the potential injury exceeds the 
cost of precaution. 204 This formula has been universally accepted as 
the standard by which the reasonable person is expected to deter-
mine whether steps should be taken to prevent injury.205 It seems 
only appropriate that courts in equity should use the same standard 
to determine whether they should take such steps in anticipatory 
nuisance actions. 
Above all, the proposed test is inherently rational. Unlike the 
traditional anticipatory nuisance rule, which focuses exclusively on 
the probability of injury when assessing risk, the proposed test 
allows for a broader, more reasoned inquiry into the nature of the 
risk involved. By taking into account the magnitude of the threat-
ened harm, courts can consider all issues relevant to a rational human 
response to danger. A calculated risk can hardly be characterized as 
such if the calculation involves only the probability of success or 
failure and ignores what is at stake. 
Because the proposed anticipatory nuisance standard is a rational 
one, it will enable courts to arrive at correct results without running 
the risk of misrepresenting evidence, as the Illinois Supreme Court 
199 See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
200 Village of Wilsonville, 86 Ill. 2d at 37-38,426 N.E.2d at 842. 
201 Id. 
202 See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text. 
203 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). 
204 Id. at 173. 
205 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, § 31, at 173. 
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did in its consideration of the probability of injury in Wilsonville. 206 
Furthermore, the proposed standard clearly identifies those factors 
appropriately considered in arriving at a correct result. Thus, the 
proposed standard will provide· a more concrete basis for analysis 
than was the case in the Wilsonville appellate decision, where the 
court seemed unable to articulate the rationale behind its conclu-
sion.207 
Another point in favor of the proposed anticipatory nuisance stan-
dard is that it can be used in those situations not reached by the 
reasonable-fear doctrine. 208 Because the proposed standard focuses 
on the central issue, the nature of the risk involved, rather than on 
the reasonableness of any fear plaintiffs may experience, it will be 
appropriate for use in both public and private nuisance actions. 
Furthermore, because it does not depend upon an interference with 
the comfortable enjoyment of property, the proposed standard is not 
restricted to residential property, but can be applied in all situations 
where any property owner's interests are threatened. 
It is also important that the assessment of risk does not become 
so restrictive as to unreasonably hinder technological development, 
especially where courts are exercising a power to enjoin activity 
before it causes harm. By insisting that the usual balancing of the 
equities test be performed in all cases, the proposed anticipatory 
nuisance analysis allows for consideration of all relevant factors: the 
magnitude of injury, the probability of injury, and the social utility 
of the defendant's conduct. This test neither favors nor disfavors the 
development of technology. 
The test employed in much of the reasonable-fear precedent, for 
example, favors the interests of risk-bearers, allowing an injunction 
to issue if any probability of injury is shown, therefore stifling po-
tentially beneficial technological innovation. 209 The traditional antic-
ipatory nuisance standard, in contrast, allows new technology to 
create risks regardless of its usefulness to society. The neutral na-
ture of the proposed test, however, would hinder innovation only 
when the risk of injury it creates outweighs the benefits it offers. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the proposed anticipatory 
nuisance standard is entirely in keeping with the historical devel-
206 See supra notes 186-91 and accompanying text. 
207 See supra note 182 and accompanying text. 
208 See supra notes 151-54 and accompanying text. 
209 See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text. 
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opment of tort law. The tension between risk-creators and risk-
bearers that has defined the evolution of tort doctrine has constantly 
shifted in response to technological advances. 210 Courts have tended 
to favor emerging technology that creates risk yet promises positive 
economic and social progress. Once a technology is established and 
the harm it creates becomes more manifest, the equilibrium tends 
to shift and courts adopt a neutral standard of risk assessment, or 
in some cases, as with strict liability, adopt a standard that favors 
the risk-bearer. 211 
Although tort law's responses to simple industrial development 
have been primarily compensatory, today's more complex and po-
tentially more hazardous technologies will in some situations create 
a need for judicial risk assessment prior to an injury taking place. 212 
If tort law is to play a continuing role in regulating the risks that 
modern society imposes upon individuals and the environment, 
courts must be willing to abandon traditional anticipatory nuisance 
doctrine. If it clings to the traditional doctrine, which strongly favors 
risk-creators, tort law will be unable to address effectively the 
unique and potentially catastrophic threats of injury created by mod-
ern technology. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Tort law as we know it today has evolved largely in response to 
risks of injury created by technology. As technology has become 
increasingly sophisticated and powerful, however, it has created 
risks of potentially unlimited or catastrophic harm that cannot be 
addressed adequately within the framework of a strictly compensa-
tory tort system. Anticipatory nuisance in its present form allows 
for the enjoining of threats of future harm, but only when it is highly 
probable that such harm will occur. Courts in some instances have 
managed to enjoin low-probability risks of future harm by focusing 
on the way in which a plaintiff's fear interferes with the comfortable 
enjoyment of property. This approach, however, is too restricted in 
its application and may thwart technological innovations that are not 
unreasonably dangerous. 
2\0 See supra notes 10-26 and accompanying text. 
211 See id. 
212 See supra notes 27--33 and accompanying text. 
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By reforming anticipatory nuisance doctrine to allow for consid-
eration of both the probability and magnitude of injury in relation 
to one another, and by insisting that the equities of a plaintiff's 
interests be weighed against the utility of a defendant's conduct in 
all cases, courts will be able to assess risks of future harm rationally 
and objectively without unreasonably hindering technological and 
social progress. 
